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ABSTRACT
We consider the pressing question of how to model, verify, and
ensure that autonomous systems meet certain obligations (like the
obligation to respect traffic laws), and refrain from impermissible
behavior (like recklessly changing lanes). Temporal logics are heav-
ily used in autonomous system design; however, as we illustrate
here, temporal (alethic) logics alone are inappropriate for reasoning
about obligations of autonomous systems. This paper proposes
the use of Dominance Act Utilitarianism (DAU), a deontic logic of
agency, to encode and reason about obligations of autonomous sys-
tems. We use DAU to analyze Intel’s Responsibility-Sensitive Safety
(RSS) proposal as a real-world case study. We demonstrate that
DAU can express well-posed RSS rules, formally derive undesirable
consequences of these rules, illustrate how DAU could help design
systems that have specific obligations, and how to model-check
DAU obligations.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization → Robotic autonomy; •
Computing methodologies → Modeling methodologies; Model
verification and validation; Knowledge representation and reason-
ing.
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1 OBLIGATIONS, PERMISSIONS AND NORMS
FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
There is now a realistic prospect that Autonomous ground Vehi-
cles (AVs) will be deployed on public roads in the next few years,
with Waymo already charging customers for self-driving taxi in
Arizona [10]. While companies produce ‘event reports’ to regula-
tors, there is a worrying sparsity of rigorous verification methods,
and of external independent assessment, of the vehicles’ perfor-
mance. The most pressing issue is that of verifying safety. So far,
the vast majority of the work in formal verification of AVs used the
tools of alethic temporal logic (like Linear [17] or Metric Temporal
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Logic [13]) to express behavioral specifications of system models.
Alethic logic is the logic of necessity and possibility: for example, if p
is a predicate, p says that p is true in every accessible world - that
is, p is necessary. Possibility is then formalized as p ∶= ¬ ¬p:
saying that p is possible is the same as saying that it is not the
case that ¬p is necessary. And so on. The best known instantiation
of this in Verification is LTL [15], in which an accessible world is
a moment in the (linear) future. Thus p formalizes ‘p is true in
every future moment’, and p formalizes ‘p is true in some future
moment’.
It is, however, equally important to think in terms of obligations
and permissions of the autonomous system: for instance, we may
wish to say that ‘It is obligatory for the AV to not rear-end a car’,
or ‘It is permissible to drive on the shoulder if the car ahead brakes
suddenly’. Obligations, permissions and prohibitions are also per-
vasive when discussing ethical questions: what should the AV do
when faced with two equally unsavory but inevitable alternatives?
Obligations and permissions are collectively called norms and state-
ments about them are called normative statements. A prominent
example of a proposed normative system for Autonomous Vehicles
(AVs) is Intel’s Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) [21], which
states what the AV should and should not do to avoid accidents.
It is essential to logically formalize proposed norms for autonomous
systems to enable automatic reasoning about their logical consistency,
consequences, and automate system design. While all current work
in AV verification and testing uses temporal logics [24], which are
types of alethic logic, it has been understood for over 70 years that
the logic of norms is different from that of necessity [16]: applying
alethic logic rules to normative statements leads to conclusions that
are intuitively paradoxical or undesirable. Consider the following
statements:
A. The car will eventually change lanes: this is a statement about
possibility. It says nothing about whether the car plays an active
role in the lane change (e.g., perhaps it will hit a slippery road
patch).
B. The car sees to it that it changes lanes: this is a statement about
agency. It tells us that the car is an active agent in the lane
change, or is choosing to change lanes.
C. The car can change lanes: this is a statement about ability. The
car might be able to do something, but have no ‘choice’ or agency
in the matter.
D. The car ought to change lanes: this is a statement about obliga-
tion, a concept not captured in the first three statements.
These are qualitatively different statements and there is no a priori
equivalence between any two of them. The logic we adopt should
reflect this: its operators and inference rules should model these
aspects. Alethic logics like LTL cannot do so.
We now give a simple but fundamental example, drawn from [16],
illustrating this point. (In Section 2 we give an AV-specific example.)
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One might be tempted to formalize obligation using the necessity
operator : that is, formalize ‘The AV should stay in its lane’ by
stay-in-lane. However, in alethic logic, p Ô⇒ p: if p is nec-
essarily true then it is true. If we interpret as obligation this reads
asObligatory p Ô⇒ p: this is clearly non-sensical because agents
sometimes violate their obligations so some obligatory things are
not true. This leads us to a major question in studying obligations:
the automatic derivation of what an agent should do when some
primary obligations are violated. I.e. we wish to study statements
of the form Obligatoryp ∧ ¬p Ô⇒ .... This is simply impossible
in pure alethic logic, since p ∧ ¬p Ô⇒ q is trivially true for any
p and q. Thus alethic logics (including common temporal logics
like LTL, MTL or CTL [6]) are not appropriate, on their own, for
automatic reasoning about norms.
Deontic logic [7] has been developed specifically to reason about
normative statements, starting with von Wright [23]. It is widely
used in contract law, including software contracts. There are many
flavors of deontic logic [11]. In this paper, we adopt Dominance Act
Utilitarianism (DAU) developed by Horty [12] because it explicitly
models all four aspects above: necessity, agency, ability and obliga-
tion. It includes a temporal logic as a component so we can describe
temporal behaviors essential to system design, and it uses branching
time, essential for modeling uncontrollable environments.
To assess whether DAU is appropriate for reasoning about the
norms of autonomous systems, we formalize a subset of Intel’s
Responsibility-Sensitive Safety, or RSS, in DAU. RSS proposes a set
of norms or rules that, if followed by all cars in traffic, would lead to
zero accidents [21]. The RSS proposal is expressed in the language
of continuous-time dynamical systems and ordinary differential
equations, but the rules to be followed are not formalized logically,
so it is not possible to reason about them. This work integrates
formal methods in AV design by complementing the dynamical
equations-based presentation of RSS in [21] with a deontic logic
formalism. We formalize RSS in DAU, which achieves three pur-
poses: first, it demonstrates the usefulness of DAU in a real use
case, namely, the analysis of a safety proposal by a major player
in autonomous driving technology. Second, it realizes a necessary
first step towards automated system design. Finally, it allows a
systematic discovery of implicit assumptions, and undesirable con-
sequences of any such proposals. A framework to do this is still
missing from the literature. Our contributions in this paper are to:
(1) formalize the normative system of RSS in DAU, to highlight
the subtle decisions that need to be made when developing
a rigorous safety specification (Section 3.2);
(2) partially infer the system structure using the DAU formal-
ization (Section 3.3);
(3) derive undesirable consequences of the RSS norms, point-
ing the way to further necessary refinements of the norms
(Section 3.4); and
(4) develop a model-checking algorithm of DAU specifications
that allows to establish whether a system has a given obliga-
tion or not (Section 4).
1.1 Related work
There is awide variety of deontic logics, tailored to different ends [7].
Standard Deontic Logic has many well-known paradoxes [11],
which have spurred the proposal of alternatives to remedy them.
Some variations are commonly used to specify legal and software
contracts as in [18]. Various attempts were made to integrate de-
ontic logic with temporal modalities (e.g., [9] and [19]). Decision
procedures exist for some logics, like the checker in [14]. Gerdes et
al. [8] have compared a deontological approach to AV design with
a consequentialist approach by formalizing them as an optimal con-
trol problem. Rizaldi et al. [20] formalize six traffic rules in Higher
Order Logic to be passed to an interactive theorem prover. As it is
our goal to logically analyze normative safety rules and use them
in system design, [8] and [20] present directions of investigation
that are orthogonal to ours. Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL)
was proposed in [1] and extended in [22] to reason about groups
of agents. ATL seems to use sure-thing reasoning, like DAU (see
Section 2), but does not natively support a notion of obligation. The
RSS proposal itself [21] uses a point mass dynamical model to de-
rive definitions of minimum safe distances between two cars. It also
proposes motion planning policies to avoid accidents; e.g., if the
car ahead hits maximum brakes, then the following car should hit
maximum brakes within a delay τ , and so on. The RSS rules are not
formalized in any logic in [21], nor are its logical consequences ex-
amined. This paper leverages DAU’s formulation of agency [12, 3.3]
to formalize well-posed RSS rules and analyze their implications.
DAU further distinguishes itself through its distinction between
what ought to be the case and what an agent ought to do [12, 3.3].
A related formulation to DAU is found in [3].
2 DOMINANCE ACT UTILITARIANISM
2.1 A deontic logic over branching time
This section summarizes the main aspects of DAU developed in [12],
starting with classical branching time models. Let Tree be a set of
moments with an irreflexive, transitive ordering relation < such
that for any three moments m1,m2,m3 in Tree , if m1 < m3 and
m2 <m3 then eitherm1 <m2 orm2 <m1. There is a unique root
moment of the tree satisfying root <m′ for allm′ ≠ root . A history
is a maximal linearly ordered set of moments from Tree: intuitively,
it is a branch of the tree that extends infinitely. Given a moment
m ∈ Tree, the set of histories that go throughm isHm ∶= {h ⋃︀m ∈ h}.
See Fig. 1 We will frequently refer to moment/history pairsm⇑h,
wherem ∈ Tree and h ∈ Hm .
Definition 1. [12, Def. 2.2] With AP a set of atomic propositions,
a branching time model is a tupleℳ = (Tree,<,v) where Tree is a
tree of moments with ordering < and v is a function that mapsm⇑h
pairs inℳ to sets of atomic propositions from 2AP .
A branching time model can be seen as the result of executing
a non-deterministic automaton that models all agents in the sys-
tem. While we will frequently speak of one agent’s obligations for
simplicity, the reader should keep in mind that a modelℳ can
represent the possible evolutions of several agents.
We will use CTL∗ as the tense logic on branching time models -
see [6] for details.1 CTL∗ includes computational tree logic (CTL)
and linear temporal logic (LTL), and has become widely used in
model checking. CTL∗ can produce sentences like ϕ ∶= ∃X(p) ∧
1The development of DAU in [12] uses a restricted temporal logic, but that is immaterial
here.
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Figure 1: A utilitarian stit model for an agent α , showing moments m < m′ with sets of histories Hm = {h1, . . . ,h6} and
Hm′ = {h1, . . . ,h4}. Each moment is marked with the actions available to α at that moment: Choicemα = {K1,K2} and Choicem′α ={K3,K4,K5}. Action K2 = {h5,h6} and K4 = {h2}. Each history is marked with the formula(s) that it satisfies and with its value
Value(h), e.g., h1 satisfies A and has value 3. m⇑h5 ⊧ (︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀ since Choicemα (h5) = K2, and both h5 and h6 satisfy A. On
the other hand, m⇑h1 ⊭ (︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀ since Choicemα (h1) = K1 = {h1,h2,h3,h4} and h4 does not satisfy A. Optimalmα = {K2} so
m⇑h5 ⊧ ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀. Optimalm′α = {K4,K5} and so α has no obligations atm′ since there is no formula ϕ s.t. ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀m′ ⊇ K4 ∪ K5 (See
Def. 6). Finally,m⇑h5 ⊧ (︀α dstit ∶ A⌋︀ because K2 ⊂ ⋃︀A⋃︀m and Hm ≠ ⋃︀A⋃︀m = {h1,h2,h3,h5,h6}.
∀ (p) which can be interpreted as ‘there exists a path where p
holds at the next state, and all paths will eventually always satisfyp’.
CTL∗ allows us to formalize the temporal evolution of events along
a given history h (e.g., ϕ), and quantify over histories passing
through a momentm (e.g., ∀ϕ meaning ‘for all histories, ϕ holds’).
In this paper, to retain a uniform satisfaction relation like [12], we
will speak of formulas holding or not at anm⇑h pair: for a pairm⇑h
in a modelℳ, we writeℳ,m⇑h ⊧ ϕ, where it is always the case
that h ∈ Hm . There should be no confusion as a CTL∗ path formula
is evaluated along h and a state formula is evaluated atm.
A formula ϕ is identified at momentm with the set of histories
where it holds ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀ℳm ∶= {h ∈ Hm ⋃︀ℳ,m⇑h ⊧ ϕ} (1)
Where there’s no risk of ambiguity, we dropℳ from the notation,
writing ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀m , etc.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the exposition of the
properly deontic aspects of DAU.
Choice. Let Aдent be a set of agents, which represent, for exam-
ple, the cars in traffic. Consider an agent α ∈ Aдent and a given
modelℳ. Then at every momentm, α is faced with a choice of
actions which we denote by Choicemα . Intuitively, an action causes
some histories from Hm to no longer be realizable, while others
still are. Thus we can identify each action K ∈ Choicemα with the
set of histories that are still realizable after taking the action, and
we may write K ⊆ Hm . See moments and actions in Fig. 1.Choicemα
must obey certain constraints which we relegate to Appendix A.
Agency. Agency is defined via the Chellas ‘sees to it’ operator
cstit , named in honor of Brian Chellas who introduced an analogous
operator in [5]. (Saying ‘John sees to it that the window is open’
means that John ensures the window is open). Intuitively, an agent
sees to it that A by taking action K at m⇑h iff, whatever other
history h′ could’ve resulted from the action, A is true atm⇑h′ as
well. Thus, the non-determinism does not prevent α from achieving
A. Let Choicemα (h) be the unique action that contains h. In Fig. 1
Choicemα (h1) = K1 = {h1,h2,h3,h4}.
Definition 2 (Chellas stit). [12, Def. 2.7] With agent α and
formula ϕ
ℳ,m⇑h ⊧ (︀α cstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀ iff Choicemα (h) ⊆ ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀ℳm
See Fig. 1. We also define a deliberative stit operator, which
captures the notion that an agent can only truly be said to do
something if it also has the choice of not doing it.
Definition 3 (Deliberative stit). [12, Def. 2.8] With α and ϕ
as before,
ℳ,m⇑h ⊧ (︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀ iff Choicemα (h) ⊆ ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀ℳm and ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀ℳm ≠ Hm
Thus (︀α dstit ∶ A⌋︀ iff some histories don’t satisfyA but α ’s choice
ensures A. See Fig. 1. The operators cstit and dstit are not inter-
changeable and they fulfill complementary roles. This paper focuses
on obligation statements of the following form.
Definition 4 (Obligations). Let α be an agent. An obligation
A is either a CTL∗ formula, or a statement of the form (︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀
or ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀ where ϕ is a CTL∗ formula.
Like Eq. (1) for CTL∗ formula, we identify an obligation A at
momentm with the set of histories where it holds⋃︀A⋃︀ℳm ∶= {h ∈ Hm ⋃︀ℳ,m⇑h ⊧ A} (2)
Obligations can be used in stit formulations, similarly to formulas
in definitions 2 and 3:ℳ,m⇑h ⊧ (︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀ iff Choicemα (h) ⊆ ⋃︀A⋃︀ℳm
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andℳ,m⇑h ⊧ (︀α dstit ∶ A⌋︀ iff Choicemα (h) ⊆ ⋃︀A⋃︀ℳm and ⋃︀A⋃︀ℳm ≠ Hm
Optimal actions. To speak of an agent’s obligations, we will need
to speak of ‘optimal actions’, those actions that bring about an ideal
state of affairs. We make the simplifying assumption that all agents
in the system collaborate to achieve a common goal. This is consis-
tent with the RSS assumption that all agents are following the same
rules to avoid collisions anywhere in traffic. LetValue ∶ Hroot → R
be a value function that maps histories ofℳ to utility values from
the real line R. This value represents the utility associated by all
the agents to this common history.
Definition 5. A utilitarian stit frame is a tuple (Tree,<,Aдent ,
Choice,Value) where Tree and < are as in branching time frames,
Aдent is a set of agents,Choice is a choice mapping (which is special-
ized as Choicemα for each agent and moment), and Value is a value
function. A utilitarian stit model is a model based on a utilitarian
stit frame. If Choicemα is finite for every α ∈ Aдent andm, the model
is said to be finite-choice.
Allmodels inwhat follows are finite-choice utilitarian stit models.
Given two sets of histories X and Y , we order them as
X ≤ Y iff Value(h) ≤ Value(h′) ∀ h ∈ X ,h′ ∈ Y (3)
Let Statemα ∶= ChoicemAдent∖{α} be the set of background states
against which α ’s decisions are to be evaluated. These are other
agents’ independent actions. Given two actions K ,K ′ in Choicemα ,
K ⪯ K ′ iff K ∩ S ≤ K ′ ∩ S for all S ∈ Statemα . That is, K ′ dominates
K iff it is preferable to it regardless of what the other agents do
(known as sure-thing reasoning). Strict inequalities are naturally
defined. Optimal actions are given by [12]
Optimalmα ∶= {K ∈ Choicemα ⋃︀ ⇑∃ K ′ ∈ Choicemα . K ≺ K ′} (4)
Optimalmα is non-empty in finite-choice utilitarian stit models [12,
Thm. 4.10].
Dominance Ought. Intuitively wewill want to say that at moment
m, agent α ought to see to it that A iff A is a necessary condition of
all the histories considered ideal at momentm. This is formalized
in the following dominance Ought operator, which is pronounced
“α ought to see to it that A holds”.
Definition 6 (Dominance ought). With α an agent and A an
obligation in a modelℳ,ℳ,m⇑h ⊧ ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀ iff K ⊆ ⋃︀A⋃︀ℳm for all K ∈ Optimalmα
See Fig. 1 for examples. If K ⊆ ⋃︀A⋃︀m we say that K guarantees
A. Note that the dominance Ought is only defined with the cstit
operator and not dstit ; this is because it leads to a simpler logic. The
dominance ought satisfies a number of pleasing logical properties;
we refer the reader to [12, Ch. 4].
Conditional obligation. It is often necessary to say that an obli-
gation is imposed only under certain conditions. Where A and B
are obligations, the statementℳ,m⇑h ⊧ ⊙((︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀⇑B) (5)
expresses that α ought to see to it that A, under the condition that
B holds.
Definition 7 (Conditional ought). With α an agent and A, B
as obligations in a modelℳ,ℳ,m⇑h ⊧ ⊙((︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀⇑B) iff
K ⊆ ⋃︀A⋃︀ℳm for all K ∈ Optimalmα ⇑⋃︀B⋃︀ℳm
where Optimalmα ⇑B (α ’s optimal actions under the condition B)
is the set of actions available to α that are optimal if we ignore
B-violating histories [12].
We note that conditional obligation is not the same as B Ô⇒⊙(︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀.2 Conditional obligation only considersB-guaranteeing
dominating histories, while this latter formula still considers all
optimal actions, not only those that guarantee the truth of B.
Syntax. We now summarize the syntax of DAU statements. Obli-
gations are generated as follows.
A ∶∶= ϕ ⋃︀ (︀αdstit ∶ A⌋︀ ⋃︀ ¬A
where ϕ ∈ CTL∗, and the semantics of (︀αdstit ∶ A⌋︀ were given in
Def. 3. Ought statements are in one of two forms:⊙(︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀ or ⊙ ((︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀⇑B)
where α is an agent and A and B are obligations. The semantics
were given in Def. 6.
2.2 Alethic Logic vs DAU for Analyzing AV
Behavior
We now offer an AV-specific example of the advantage that a DAU
formalization offers over pure temporal logic. Specifically, DAU
allows deriving obligations over time by construction and in a
uniform manner; attempts to do so using pure temporal logic are
unsatisfactory. Consider the stit model in Fig. 2, which models the
situation on the left: agent α could either stay in its lane behind the
slower β (K1), or pass β by going into the opposite lane (K2) and
risk a head-on collision. Every history in K1 is deemed preferable
to every history in K2 because K1 eliminates the risk of collision, so
we assign history values accordingly, as shown. If the agent does
K2, then it needs to get back into its lane. Thus atm′, every history
in K2 is preferable to every history in K1, and this is reflected in
the values. Naturally, the histories in K1 atm satisfy ψ ∶= ∀(¬p)
(α does not pass, i.e., does not change lanes), those in K1 at m′
satisfy π = ∀ Collision (since α remains in the opposite lane
in this case), and those in K2 atm′ satisfy φt ∶= (︀0∶t⌋︀ p, t = 0, 1, 2,
which says that α changes lanes in at most t time steps ( (︀n∶m⌋︀ ϕ ∶=
Xnϕ ∨Xn+1ϕ . . . ∨Xmϕ and X t is X repeated t times). Moreover,
suppose K1 histories atm satisfy some arbitrary formula χ . The
following obligations are then automatically derived from the stit
model3:
Atm , ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ψ ∧ χ⌋︀ (6)
Atm′ , ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ φ2⌋︀ (since φ2 is true if φ0 or φ1 are) (7)
Thus it emerges that atm, α ought to not change lanes. Also atm, α
ought to see to it that χ - which may have nothing to do with how
the values were assigned to the histories. E.g., χ might constrain
2This is not a well-formed DAU expression, but we can extend the logic to give this
expression its natural definition as ¬B ∨ ⊙(︀α cst it ∶ A⌋︀.
3In DAU, ⊙(︀α cst it ∶ ϕ⌋︀ ∧ ⊙(︀α cst it ∶ ψ ⌋︀ is equivalent to ⊙ (︀α cst it ∶ ϕ ∧ψ ⌋︀
A Deontic Logic Analysis of Autonomous Systems’ Safety HSCC ’20, April 22–24, 2020, Sydney, NSW, Australia
K1 K2
h1 h2 h4 h5 h6
  ⇡
0
910
m
K1 K2
3
'1 '2
3 3
h3
↵
 
m0
'0
h7
 
8
    
Figure 2: Deriving obligations for α from the stit model. K1: stay in lane, K2: change lanes.
the motor’s energy consumption; it is nonetheless an obligation
because it’s a necessary condition for achieving an optimal history.
If the agent violates (6) atm by doing K2, then automatically the
model yields that its obligation at m′ is (7). As explained in the
Introduction, such generation of new obligations is not possible
in pure temporal logic, and would have to be added somewhat
awkwardly to the atomic propositions or imposed from outside the
logic. For example, the agent might try to satisfy something implied
by ψ ∧ φ2, like ∃( (︀1∶2⌋︀ p) (i.e. there exists a path that satisfies p
within the next two states). However, atm this is too permissive,
since we really do prefer not changing lanes at all. And atm′ it is
too restrictive, since φ0 is a perfectly legitimate way of meeting
α ’s obligations then. Another method may be to specify behavior
through reactive implications, e.g. "oncoming-traffic Ô⇒ change
lanes", but this sort of explicit rule must be built in by a human
designer. The conclusion is that there is a need to use a logic that
captures preferences and derives obligations from them, as well
as what agents are able and unable to do; a logic of agency and
obligation.
3 FORMALIZING RSS IN DAU
Responsibility-Sensitive Safety, or RSS, is a proposal put forth by
Intel’s Mobileye division [21]. It proposes rules or requirements
that, if followed by all cars in traffic, would lead to zero accidents.
Our objective here is to formalize some of the RSS rules in the
language of Dominance Act Utilitarianism (DAU), and study their
logical consequences. Three important points must be made:
(A) The formalization does not depend on the dynamical equations
that govern the cars because we wish our conclusions to be
independent of these lower-level concerns. This is consistent
with the standard AV control architecture where a logical plan-
ner decides what to do next (‘change lanes’ or ‘turn right’) and
a lower-level motion planner executes these decisions. Our
logical analysis concerns the logical planner.
(B) We are not trying to formalize general traffic laws or driving
scenarios, which is outside the scope of this paper. We are only
formalizing the RSS rules.
(C) Every formalization, in any logic, can always be refined. We
are not aiming for the most detailed formalization; we aim for
a useful formalization.
We have three objectives in doing so: demonstrating the usefulness
of DAU in a real use case; highlighting the ambiguities implicit in
such proposals, which would go unnoticed without formalization;
and automating the checking of logical consistency and deriving
of conclusions. We first present the RSS rules in natural language
(Section 3.1), then their formalization (Section 3.2), and finally we
analyze the rules’ logical consequences.
3.1 The RSS rules
The rules for Responsibility-Sensitive Safety are [21]:
RSS1. Do not hit someone from behind.
RSS2. Do not cut-in (to a neighboring lane) recklessly.
RSS3. Right-of-way is given, not taken.
RSS4. Be careful of areas with limited visibility.
RSS5. If you can avoid an accident without causing another one,
you must do it.
RSS6. To change lanes, you should not wait forever for a perfect
gap: i.e., you should not wait for a gap large enough to get
into even when the other car, already in the lane, maintains
its current motion.
RSS6 is derived directly from the following in [21, Section 3]:
“the interpretation [of the duty-of-care law] should lead to [...] an
agile driving policy rather than an overly-defensive driving which
inevitably would confuse other human drivers and will block traffic
[...]. As an example of a valid, but not useful, interpretation is to
assume that in order to be “careful” our actions should not affect
other road users. Meaning, if we want to change lane we should
find a gap large enough such that if other road users continue
their own motion uninterrupted we could still squeeze-in without
a collision. Clearly, for most societies this interpretation is over-
cautious and will lead the AV to block traffic and be non-useful.”
Note that, consistently with points (A)-(C) above, this is stated without
any reference to dynamics or specific scenarios. The RSS authors are
concerned that overlay cautious driving might lead to unnatural
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traffic, so RSS aims to allow cars to move a bit assertively, and
defines correct reactions to that.
We will not study RSS4 and 5 as they are currently too vague for
formalization.
3.2 Formalization of RSS Rules
Formalizing RSS1. Letϕ be a formula denoting ‘Hit someone from
behind’. A plausible formalization of RSS1 is then
RSS1. ⊙ (︀α cstit ∶ ¬ϕ⌋︀
That is, α ought to see to it that it does not hit anyone from behind.
However, suppose that α finds itself, through no fault of its own,
in a situation where a collision is unavoidable at timem, that is,
Hm = ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀ℳm . Then we can show that RSS1 cannot be met. This
is something we know at design time. There isn’t much value in
specifying obligations that remain in force even when they become
impossible to meet, since we can’t design controllers for them. A
better formalization of RSS1 would automatically, as a matter of
logic, remove the obligation when a collision becomes unavoidable.
This can be done using dstit of Def. 3 as follows:
RSS1r . ⊙ (︀α cstit ∶ ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀⌋︀
This says that α should see to it that it does not deliberately ensure
an accident ϕ. This form of obligation is called refraining: in this
case, α refrains from hitting anyone from behind. RSS1 and RSS1r
are not logically equivalent. If ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀ℳm = Hm , then (︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀ is nec-
essarily false, and RSS1r is trivially satisfied since ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ ⊺⌋︀ is
a theorem of DAU. Thus RSS1r does not impose unrealistic obliga-
tions on the agent. Of course, a test engineer should then examine
why the inevitable situation arose in the first place - but that is a
separate debugging effort. The control engineer can now focus on
designing a controller that meets the more realistic RSS1r .
Formalizing RSS2. Define two CTL∗ formulas,ψ ∶ a non-reckless
cut-in, andψr : a reckless cut-in. Then RSS2 is formalizable as
RSS2. ⊙ (︀α cstit ∶ ∀ (ψ ∨ψr Ô⇒ ¬ψr )⌋︀.
That is, α should see to it that always, if a cut-in happens, then
it is a non-reckless cut-in.
Formalizing RSS3. Formalizing this rule requires some care. First,
note that RSS3 should probably be amended to say that ‘Right-of-
way is given, not taken, and some car is given the right-of-way’
- otherwise, traffic comes to a standstill. We will first focus on
formalizing the prohibition (nobody should take the r-o-w), then
we will formalize the positive obligation (somebody must be given
it).
Let Aдent = {α , β ,γ , . . .} be a finite set of agents. Define the
atomic propositions GROW αβ : β gives right-of-way to α and pα :
α proceeds/drives through the conflict region. Then TROWα ∶=
pα ∧ ¬(GROW αβ ∧GROW αγ ∧ . . .) formalizes taking the r-o-w: α
proceeds without being given the right of way by everybody. We
could now express the prohibition in RSS3: every α ought to see to
it that it does not take the r-o-w:
RSS3prohib0. ⋀
α∈Aдent ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ ¬TROWα ⌋︀ (8)
The difficulty with this formulation is that it could lead to α being
obliged to force everybody else to give it the r-o-w - something over
which, a priori, it has no control. To see this, we need the following,
whose proof is omitted due to lack of space.
Theorem 1. Given obligations A and B, ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ A ∨ B⌋︀ ∧(∀¬A) Ô⇒ ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ B⌋︀
In other words, if α has an obligation to fulfill A or B at m⇑h,
but every available history violates A (∀¬A), then its obligation
is effectively to fulfill B. Applied to Eq. (8) with A = ¬pα and
B = ∧β≠αGROW αβ , Thm. 1 says that if α is in a situation where it
has no choice but to proceed (e.g. as a result of slippage on a wet
road, say), then its obligation is to see to it that everybody else gives
it the right-of-way, which is unreasonable.
To remedy this, we first formalize the positive obligation: some-
body must be given the right-of-way. This seems to be a group
obligation: the group must give r-o-w to one of its members. Group
obligations are formally defined in [12, Ch. 6]. Therefore, we define
an atomic proposition дα : r-o-w is Granted to α . Then we formalize
RSS3pos . ⊙ (︀Aдent cstit ∶ ∃ ∨α∈Aдent дα ⌋︀ (9)
This says the group Aдent has an obligation to give r-o-w to some-
one, and the only choice is in who gets it. We now come back to
formalizing the prohibition:
RSS3prohib . ⋀
α∈Aдent ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ (¬дα Ô⇒ ¬pα )⌋︀ (10)
Finally, we formalize RSS3 as the conjunction RSS3prohib ∧
RSS3pos .
Formalizing RSS6. This rule says that if the car wants to change
lanes, it shouldn’t wait for the perfect gap (otherwise, traffic is
stalled). First, let’s formalize ‘waiting for the perfect gap’, that is,
waiting until the other car, already in the lane, gives the AV the
right-of-way (e.g., by slowing down). Let the atomic propositionwα
mean ‘α wants to change lanes’ and recall thatpα means ‘α proceeds
through the conflict region’ while дα means ‘α is Granted the
right-of-way’. For conciseness, let’s introduce the bounded Release
operator ℛN , which informally says that over the next N steps,
either ψ does not hold at all, or it does and ϕ holds continuously
untilψ holds.
ψℛϕ =ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧Xψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧Xϕ ∧X 2ψ) ∨ . . .
. . . ∨ (ϕ ∧Xϕ ∧ . . . ∧XN−1ϕ ∧XNψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧Xϕ ∧ . . .XNϕ)
Then ¬pαℛдα says that α waits for the perfect gap up to N time
steps (butwe don’t knowwhat happens after this). (︀α dstit ∶ ¬pαℛдα ⌋︀
formalizes the agent deliberately seeing to it that it waits to be given
the right-of-way, when it doesn’t have to. Finally,
RSS6. ⊙ ((︀α cstit ∶ ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ¬pα𝒰Nдα ⌋︀⌋︀⇑wα ) (11)
formalizes that α ought to refrain from seeing to it that it waits for
the right-of-way given that it wants to change lanes. This obligation
does not delay the lane change - in particular, it does not require the
car to wait for the perfect gap. It also does not rush α : it can wait if
it wishes to. We emphasize that RSS assertive driving requires that
an AV sometimes force its way, as expressed in (11).
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Figure 3: The optimal action at m, K1, necessarily contains
history h˜ in which comes a moment i′′ s.t. i′′⇑h˜ ⊧ p ∧¬д. The
controller must choose an action, prior to i′′, that does not
contain h˜. Since the controller always chooses optimal ac-
tions, the Value function must favor K4, as shown.
3.3 Application: Inferring stit model structure
In DAU, obligations are automatically derived from the stit model
via Def. 2. Given an obligation that wewant the system to have, how
should we structure the stit model so that it has that obligation?
This is similar to synthesis-from-specifications, an active research
area in programming and in Cyber-Physical Systems. This section
gives an example where it is possible to manually partially infer
the stit model structure from the RSS obligations.
Consider again the RSS3prohib and RSS6 statements (Eqs. (10)
and (11)).
Proposition 1. A stit model has both obligations RSS3prohib and
RSS6 atm if for every optimal action K ∈ Optimalmα , it holds that⋃︀K ⋃︀ ≥ 2, and there exist a history h˜ ∈ K and a momentm′ >m in h˜ s.t.⋃︀Choicem′α ⋃︀ ≥ 2,m⇑h˜ ⇑⊧CTL∗ (¬дα Ô⇒ ¬pα ) and h˜ is not in any
optimal action atm′.
The proof is omitted due to lack of space. The conclusion of
the Proposition, illustrated in Fig. 3, is counter-intuitive: it necessi-
tates the existence of a history h˜ along which one of the formulas,(¬дα Ô⇒ ¬pα ), is violated. But since the inferred structure
places h˜ in a non-optimal action (viaValue), this doesn’t lead to an
obligation violation.
3.4 Application: undesirable consequence of
RSS star-calculations
One of the main tenets of RSS is that an AV is only responsible for
avoiding potential accidents between itself and other cars (so-called
‘star calculations’); interactions between 2 other cars are not its
concern [21, Remarks 1 and 8]. Yet everyday driving experience
makes clear that our actions can be faulted for at least facilitating an
accident: e.g., by repeated braking, I may cause the car behind me
to do the same, leading the car behind it to rear-end it. Or I might
make a sudden lane change over two lanes, causing the car in the
lane next to me to over-react when I speed past it, and collide with
someone else. We now show how this intuition is automatically
captured by the DAU logic, and that RSS star-calculations lead to
undesirable behavior of the AV.
Letϕ ∈CTL∗ denote a formula expressing “Accident between two
other cars”, and assume the accident is such that α can facilitate it as
in the above 2 examples. Then (︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀ says that α (deliberately)
sees to it that the accident happens even though it could avoid
doing so; given what we assumed about this accident, this means α
facilitates the accident. Then (︀α dstit ∶ ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀⌋︀ expresses that
α sees to it that it does not facilitate the accident: this is a form of
refraining. Finally, (︀α dstit ∶ ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀⌋︀⌋︀ says that α
refrains from refraining, that is, α does not refrain from facilitating
the accident (even though it could). The RSS position is that it is OK
for α to refrain from refraining [21, Remarks 1 and 8], as formalized
here.
However, refraining from refraining is the same as doing. For-
mally [12, 2.3.3.](︀α dstit ∶ ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀⌋︀⌋︀ ≡ (︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀
And we argue that this matches our intuition: to not refrain from
facilitating an accident even though one could is the same as facili-
tating it. In other words, under this formalization, the RSS position
is tantamount to allowing AVs to facilitate accidents between others
- clearly, an undesirable conclusion. This aspect of RSS, therefore,
needs refinement to take into account longer-range interactions
between traffic participants.
4 SYSTEM DESIGN AND MODEL CHECKING
DAU OBLIGATIONS
The system designer’s job is to design a system that has the right
obligations; it is then the control engineer’s job to design a con-
troller that makes the system meet these obligations. In DAU, obli-
gations are automatically derived from stit models/trees, but design-
ers usually model an agent as an automaton or a similar structure.
The question then naturally poses itself: given an agent model,
how do we verify whether it has a given obligation? Answering
this question is a crucial design step: there is no point designing
controllers that meet the wrong obligations. This can be cast as a
model-checking question, which this section tackles. All proofs are
in the appendices.
4.1 Modeling an agent
Definition 8 (Stit automaton). LetAP be a finite set of atomic
propositions. A stit automatonT is a tupleT = (Q,q0,𝒦, F ,∆,L,w,λ),
where Q is a finite set of states, q0 is the initial state, 𝒦 is a finite set
of actions (𝒦 ⊂ 2Hroot )), F ⊂ Q is a set of final states, ∆ ⊂ Q ×𝒦×Q
is a finite transition relation such that if (q,K ,q′) and (q,K ′,q′) are
in ∆ then K = K ′, L ∶ Q → 2AP is a labeling function,w ∶ ∆ → R is a
weight function, and λ ∶ Rω → R is an accumulation function.
Denote by ∆(q) ⊂ ∆ the set of outgoing transitions from q
(∆(q) = {(q,K ,q′) ∈ ∆}), by Post(q,K) = {q′ ⋃︀ (q,K ,q′) ∈ ∆(q)}
the successors of q under K , and by Post(q) = ∪K ∶(q,K,q′)∈∆(q)
Post(q,K) all the successors of q. Finally, we denote by T .q0 the
initial state of T when there’s a need to clarify the automaton.
Note that T is a type of non-deterministic weighted automaton. Its
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Figure 4: Left: a stit model generated by executing the stit automaton T (transition weights not shown). Center and right:
Automata Tn and T ′n used in Algorithm 1. T1 only has K1 as first action, and T ′1 is obtained by re-naming states of T1 and
‘addingâĂŹ a copy of T1 to it. Executions of T ′1 are simply the execution of T that start with K1.
unweighted counterpart Tu is a classical transition system; thus
for a CTL∗ formula ϕ, we could model-check whether Tu ⊧ ϕ. A set
of agents is modeled by the product of all individual stit automata,
which is itself a stit automaton. (When taking the product, we
must define how weights are combined and how to construct the
product’s accumulation function, which are application-specific
considerations.) Therefore the rest of this section applies to stit
automata, whether they model one or multiple agents. We will
continue to refer to one agent α for simplicity.
From automata to stit models. Let Sω denote the set of infi-
nite sequences (ai)i∈N with ai ∈ S . An execution of a stit au-
tomaton T is a sequence π ∈ ∆ω of transitions of the form π =(q0,K0,q1)(q1,K1,q2) . . .. The corresponding sequence of actions
K0,K1, . . . ∈ 𝒦ω is called a strategy. Because of non-determinism, a
strategy can produce multiple executions. An execution of the au-
tomaton generates a stit model in the natural way: starting in state
q0 the automaton takes an infinite sequence of actions from𝒦, thus
non-deterministically traversing an infinite number of transitions
e from ∆. These sequences of transitions form the histories in the
corresponding stit model, with every transition e adding a moment
to the histories. The value(s) of those histories are obtained by ac-
cumulatingw(e) along the traversed transitions using function λ.
See Fig. 4 for an example. The formal construction and proof are in
Appendix B.
Theorem 2. The structureℳT obtained by executing a stit au-
tomaton T is a utilitarian stit model with finite Choicemα for every
agent α and momentm.
4.2 Model checking algorithm
The cstit model-checking problem is: Given a stit automaton T
that models an agent α and an obligation A, determine whetherℳT , root⇑h ⊧ ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀ for some h ∈ Hroot . The case of condi-
tional oughts ⊙((︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀⇑B) is similarly handled and we omit
the details.
Given the structure of an obligation given in Def. 4, the model-
checking problem can be broken down into two parts: what is the set
of optimal actions at root , Optimalrootα ? And out of these optimal
actions, which ones guarantee the truth of A? (Recall Eqs. (3)-(4):
action optimality is determined solely by the Value function, and
not by which obligations its histories satisfy). If all optimal actions
guarantee A, then by Def. 2,ℳT has obligation A at root⇑h. The
algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1 page 9. In it, ⊧CTL∗ denotes
the classical CTL∗ satisfaction relation.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 returns True iffℳ, root⇑h ⊧ ⊙(︀α cstit ∶
A⌋︀. It has complexityO(2m(⋃︀T ⋃︀+cλ+⋃︀T ⋃︀⋅2⋃︀ϕ ⋃︀)), where cλ is the cost of
computing the minimum and maximum values of a strategy executed
on automaton T and ⋃︀T ⋃︀ is the number of states and transitions in T .
The proof is in Appendix C. This algorithm can be amended
to accept a conditional obligation ⊙((︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀⇑B) by accepting
only those actions K in Optimalrootα that guarantee A and B. The
computation of the minimum and maximum values of a strategy’s
execution line 8 clearly depends on the function λ used for accu-
mulating weights along the execution: e.g., if λ is addition and all
the weights are positive, then all executions have infinite value,
and every future is ideal, which is a comforting thought but of
little interest in modeling the real world. This question is related to
but distinct from temporal logic accumulation [2] and quantitative
languages [4]. We give now one example of a λ that can model real-
world phenomena, and lead to finite values of un . Take λ = min.
For instance, ifw((q,K ,q′)) is the time-to-collision resulting from
action K then Value(h) is the shortest time-to-collision encoun-
tered along the history, and an optimal history is one with the
highest minimum time-to-collision. It’s a simple matter to prove
that un is the maximum weight of any reachable transition from q0,
which can be computed in a finite number of steps. (Unfortunately,
different λs will, in general, require different customized analyzes.)
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Data: A stit automaton T = (Q,q0,𝒦, F ,∆,L,w,λ), an
obligation A
Result:ℳT , root⇑h ⊧ ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀
1 Set root = 0
2 Set Choicerootα = {K ∈ 𝒦 ⋃︀ (q0,K ,q′) ∈ ∆ for some q′} ={K1, . . . ,Km}
// First step: find optimal actions at root
3 for 1 ≤ n ≤m do
/* Construct automaton T ′n s.t. every execution
of T ′n is an execution of T starting with
action Kn. See Fig. 4. */
4 Create automaton Tn by deleting all transitions (q0,K ,q′)
with K ≠ Kn
5 Create a copy T renn of Tn
6 Create the automaton T ′n as a union of T renn and T , with
every transition (q,K ,T renn .q0) in T renn replaced by a
transition (q,K ,T .q0)
8 Compute the max value, un , and min value, ℓn , of any T ′n
strategy starting at q0
9 end
/* An interval (︀ℓn ,un⌋︀ is un-dominated if there is
no other interval (︀ℓ′n ,u′n⌋︀, computed in the above
for-loop, s.t. ℓ′n > un */
11 Find all un-dominated intervals (︀ℓn ,un⌋︀
13 Set Optimalrootα = {Kn ∈
Choicerootα ⋃︀ (︀ℓn ,un⌋︀ is un-dominated}
/* Second step: decide whether all actions K in
Optimalrootα guarantee A, i.e., K ⊆ ⋃︀A⋃︀root . */
15 for Kn ∈ Optimalrootα do
16 if A is a CTL∗ formula then
/* Does every execution of T starting with
Kn satisfy A? */
17 Use CTL∗ model-checking to check whether
T ′n ⊧CTL∗ ∀A
18 if T ′n ⇑⊧CTL∗ ∀A // Optimal action Kn does not
guarantee A
19 then
21 return False
22 end
24 else if A = (︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀ with ϕ ∈ CTL∗ then
// This is true iff Hroot = ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀root
26 Model-check whether T ⊧CTL∗ ∀ϕ
/* This is true iff Kn guarantees ϕ, is not
equiv. to line 26 */
27 Model-check whether T ′n ⊧CTL∗ ∀ϕ
28 if T ⊧CTL∗ ∀ϕ or T ′n ⇑⊧CTL∗ ∀ϕ then
30 return False
31 end
33 else
/* Last case: A = ¬(︀α dstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀ with ϕ ∈ CTL∗.
Similar to previous case on line 24 with
obvious modifications */
34 end
35 end
37 Return True
Algorithm 1:Model checking DAU.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated the use of Dominance Act Utilitarianism in
formalizing safety norms for autonomous vehicles. Our objective
was to assess the feasibility and utility of doing so: we expressed
safety norms from RSS in DAU; found undesirable consequences in
these norms; and showed that system designers can automatically
derive a formalized system’s obligations and objectives.
It is desirable next to enrich the interaction between deontic and
temporal modalities, e.g. to express things like ‘In the next planning
cycle the AV must see to it that it changes lanes’. This then allows
reasoning about obligation propagation through time [3]. It will be
equally important to study obligation inheritance between groups
and individuals: e.g., if it is the group’s obligation to give the right-
of-way, what does that imply for individual obligations? Given
that deontic logics were developed for ethical analysis, this work
also opens the way to formally considering ethical implications of
system design. In our experience even framing technical specifica-
tions as obligations can make explicit an implicit norm. Addressing
ethical considerations is necessary to build trust in autonomous
systems, and this work suggests it may be possible to formalize a a
system’s ethical constraints, and analyze the moral implications of
its design. These and other considerations will ultimately determine
the suitability of DAU for AV design and verification.
A MORE ELEMENTS OF DOMINANCE ACT
UTILITARIANISM
Agent choice. The choice mapping Choicemα in a general deontic
stit model obeys● The actions in Choicemα partition the set Hm : K ∩ K ′ = ∅
for every K ,K ′ and ∪K∈Choicemα K = Hm . There is no loss of
generality in this constraint, it is a formality that allows us
to maintain the useful tree structure.● Independence of agents: given any group of agents Γ ⊆
Aдent , ∩α∈ΓChoicemα ≠ ∅. That is, the actions of one agent
do not prevent the choice of action available to any other
agent at the same momentm.● No choice between undivided histories: If two histories are
still undivided atm (that is, they share a momentm′ > m)
then they belong to the same action K in Choicemα .
B CONSTRUCTION OFℳT AND PROOF OF
THM. 2
We give the formal construction of stit modelℳT from stit au-
tomaton T , then prove Thm. 2. The construction is as follows (see
Fig. 4).● Initialization: set iteration i = 1,q = q0, root = 0, S = {∐︀q0, root̃︀},
Tree = {root}.● Expansion: Set S′ = ∅. For every couple ∐︀q,m̃︀ ∈ S ,
Exp1) setChoicemα = {K ∶ (q,K ,q′) ∈ ∆(q) for some q′}: the agent
has a choice of actions atm from the actions that label the
transitions out of q.
Exp2) For everyK ∈ Choicemα , and every q′ ∈ Post(q,K), add a new
momentmK (q′, i) toTree withmK (q′, i) >m, and such that
the history ending with the moments (m,mK (q′, i)) belongs
to action K . Also, add the couple ∐︀q′,mK (q′, i)̃︀ to S′.
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Exp3) Set the label mapv(m⇑h) = L(q) for every history h passing
throughm.● Update: Set S = S′. For the next iteration, set i = i + 1. Goto
Expansion.● Valuation: For every history h constructed in the Expansion
loop, its value is computed as Value(h) = λ(w(ei)i∈N) where ei ’s
are the transitions taken while constructing h. (λ must be such that
infinite accumulation yields a finite value).
Thm. 2. We first verify that ℳT is a branching time model
(Def. 1). The ordering between moments is irreflexive and tran-
sitive by construction.
Take 3 moments m1, m2 and m3 s.t. m1 < m3 and m2 < m3.
Moments are only added in Exp2 som3 =mK (q′, i) for some q′, i ,
and by construction there is a unique momentmK ′(q, i −1) at level
i − 1 s.t.mK (q′, i) >mK ′(q, i − 1). By a simple inductive argument,
there is a unique moment mKj (qj , j) at level j s.t. mK (q′, i) >
mKj (qj , j) for every j < i . Thus the sequence of moments that are
smaller thanm(q′, i) forms a chain (a linear order) to which must
belong bothm2 andm3, so eitherm2 <m3 orm3 <m2.
The tree is rooted at 0 as can be easily established by induction
on i .
The function v in Exp3 plays the role of the stit model’s label
map.
We now show that Choicemα satisfies the constraints of Appen-
dix A on choices:● The actions inChoicemα partition Hm : indeed, take a history start-
ing atm =mK (q, i − 1). It is expanded in Exp2 only, bymK ′(q′, i)
say, and the expanded history ∐︀m,mK ′(q′, i)̃︀ is assigned to only
one action. Thus the histories ∐︀m,mK ′(q′, i)̃︀,q′ ∈ Post(q,K ′),K ′ ∈
Choicemα are partitioned among the actions atm. By definition of
the automaton transition relation, two different actions must lead
to two different states q′ and q′′ so the newly created moments
mK ′(q′, i + 1) andmK ′′(q′′, i + 1) at the next iteration i + 1, and
which expand these histories, are different. Therefore, two histories
that were in different actions atm will never share a moment after
m. Thus the actions atm partition Hm .● Independence of agents: this is automatically guaranteed by using
an automaton that models the product of all stit automata.● No choice between undivided histories: as established in the first
bullet of the proof, histories that are in different actions atm will
never share a moment afterm. Therefore, two histories that share
a moment atm′ >m must be in the same action atm.
Finally, Choicemα is finite for each moment since, as can be seen
in Exp1, Choicemα is (isomorphic to) a subset of ∆ and the latter is
finite. QED. □
C PROOF OF THM. 3
Recall that by executing a stit automaton, a stit model is created
(Appendix B).
Lemma 1. The histories generated by T ′n are exactly the histories
of T whose first action is Kn , modulo a re-naming of the states.
Proof. Recall that T ′n has two components, namely a copy T renn
ofTn and a copy ofT . See Fig. 4.Tn is obtained by removing transi-
tions fromT , thus every history generated byTn is a validT -history.
Every history generated by Tn starts with Kn by construction. So
every history h of T ′n starts with Kn , because it starts in T renn .
Case 1: h never leaves T renn . T renn is nothing but a renaming of
Tn and we’ve already established that a history ofTn is a history of
T , so this case is done.
Case 2: h leaves T renn . That is, a transition takes the execution
into theT copy. Up to the transition,h is a history ofT as established
in Case 1. The transition itself, say (q,K ,T .q0), is a valid transition
of T (modulo re-naming) since it was created by replacing a T
transition of the form (T .q,T .K ,T .q0). Once in the T copy, the
history of course continues to be a valid history of T . QED. □
Lemma 2. The set computed at line 13 is indeed Optimalrootα .
Proof. Every history ofT ′n starts withKn so ℓn = min{Value(h) ⋃︀ h ∈
Kn} and un = max{Value(h) ⋃︀ h ∈ Kn}. By definition of action
dominance, Kn ⪯ K ′n in T iff un ≤ ℓ′n . So (︀ℓn ,un⌋︀ is un-dominated
iff its action Kn is un-dominated and must be optimal. QED. □
Lemma 3. If line 21 is executed, then Kn ⊈ ⋃︀A⋃︀root .
Proof. If T ′n ⇑⊧ ∀A this means some execution h˜ of T ′n violates
A. By Lemma 1 h˜ is also a history of T starting with the optimal
action Kn , so that Kn ⊈ ⋃︀A⋃︀root . QED. □
Lemma 4. If line 30 is executed, thenℳ, root⇑h ⇑⊧ ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ ϕ⌋︀
Proof. T ⊧CTL∗ ∀ϕ iff every history of T satisfies ϕ and so
Hroot = ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀root ; in this case, by definition ofdstit , root⇑h ⇑⊧ (︀α dstit ∶
ϕ⌋︀. T ′n ⇑⊧CTL∗ ∀ϕ iff there exists a history h˜ of T ′n which violates ϕ.
Again this is also a history of T which belongs to the optimal Kn
so that Kn ⊈ ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀root . QED. □
Thm. 3. We need to establish that the algorithm returns True
iff K ⊆ ⋃︀A⋃︀root for every optimal K . The set of optimal actions is
computed at line 13 by Lemma 2. The for-loop at line 15 visits each
optimal action in turn. Line 37 is executed iff none of the ‘return
False’ statements preceding it are executed; namely, iff K ⊆ ⋃︀A⋃︀root
by Lemma 3 in CaseA is CTL∗, or iff H ≠ ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀root and K ⊆ ⋃︀ϕ⋃︀root in
the case of line 24 by Lemma 4 (and the case of line 33 is similarly
treated). These are the definition of root⇑h ⊧ ⊙(︀α cstit ∶ A⌋︀.
For the complexity, the first for-loop takes 2⋃︀T ⋃︀ operations per
iteration to create the automata copies and 2cλ to compute ℓn and
un . Finding the un-dominated intervals takesm − 1 comparisons
to find the largest ℓn and m to compare each un to max ℓn . The
second for-loop does at the most two CTL∗ model-checking runs
per optimal action; each run has complexity O(⋃︀T ⋃︀ ⋅ 2⋃︀ϕ ⋃︀) and there
are at mostm optimal actions. The total is then O(2m(⋃︀T ⋃︀ + cλ) +
2m − 1 + 2m(⋃︀T ⋃︀2⋃︀ϕ ⋃︀)). QED. □
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